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VIETNAM’S DECREE ON MICROFINANCE: A FLAWED 
ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN ENABLING LEGAL 
ENVIRONMENT FOR MICROFINANCE 
Elin M. King† 
Abstract: Despite its increasing as a development tool microfinance still faces 
significant barriers in reaching the poorest of the poor.  Microfinance programs often 
respond well to short-term needs but are not designed to handle the long-term struggles 
faced by lending institutions.  To resolve these problems, many in the microfinance field 
have begun to tout the concept of creating “enabling” legal and regulatory frameworks.  
Such an enabling environment would ideally eliminate unreasonable barriers to entry into 
the field, encourage innovation, and reinforce industry best practices.  An enabling 
regulatory scheme could also increase legal certainty, encourage more investors to enter 
the field and allow microfinance institutions (“MFIs”) to raise money by accessing world 
financial markets. 
In an effort to create such an enabling environment, Vietnam passed a Microfinance 
Decree in 2004, creating a separate regulatory scheme for microfinance institutions.  
Prior to the passage of the Microfinance Decree, the legal status of microfinance 
institutions in Vietnam was very ambiguous.  Although the Microfinance Decree creates 
a more predictable and stable environment, it does not achieve many of the goals of an 
“enabling” environment, and it threatens the viability of many of the MFIs already 
operating in Vietnam.  The new framework makes strides by clarifying the legal status of 
MFIs and allowing them to become deposit-taking institutions under limited 
circumstances.  The new law also contains provisions aimed at increasing 
professionalism and encouraging long-term planning.  Unfortunately, the Microfinance 
Decree also contains provisions that may discourage commercial and foreign investment 
in microfinance and create unnecessary burdens for small MFIs.  In order for Vietnam to 
truly enable the growth of microfinance it should enact new provisions to protect small 
MFIs, encourage new players to enter the microfinance field, and continue to develop the 
regulations underpinning the Microfinance Decree. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the Nobel 
Peace Prize “for their efforts to create economic and social development 
from below.”1  Neither a politician nor a traditional peace activist, 
Mohammad Yunus is, instead, an economist who developed a system of 
advancing small loans to people living in impoverished conditions.2  What 
started as a social experiment three decades ago has blossomed into a major 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professors Veronica Taylor and Jane Winn and the journal 
editorial staff.  
1
 Press Release, Nobel Foundation, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.  
2
 Michael Phillips et al., 'Microloan' Father Yunus Is Awarded Nobel Peace Prize—Bank Spurred 
Global Movement Through Aid to Women, Poor; Major Insurers Following Suit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 
2006, at B1. 
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development tool used in many parts of the world.3  Proponents claim that 
microfinance is an important tool that will help raise the status of women 
and alleviate poverty.4 
Despite examples of success such as the Grameen Bank, however, 
most MFIs are unable to maintain viability over the long term.5  Of the large 
number of MFIs operating worldwide, only around sixty have a sustainable 
or near sustainable financial model.6  The majority of MFIs cannot meet the 
demand for financial services with traditional funding sources.7  Although 
many MFIs would like to launch more sophisticated financial programs, 
barriers such as financial requirements set by central banks, prohibitions on 
savings mobilization, and interest rate subsidies in many countries prevent 
most MFIs from becoming anything more than donor-dependent grassroots 
lending programs.8 
The precarious financial position of many MFIs severely limits their 
ability to expand offerings and to meet the needs of the poorest of the poor.9  
Although a number of reforms have been proposed to deal with these issues, 
many development agencies, such as the World Bank, have begun to focus 
on the need for legal and regulatory reform.10  In response, a handful of 
countries have either passed or are in the process of drafting “enabling” 
legislation.11  Such an enabling environment would, ideally, eliminate 
unreasonable barriers to entry into the field, encourage innovation, and 
reinforce industry best practices.  An enabling regulatory scheme would also 
                                           
3
 For a summary of microfinance initiatives in many different countries, see United Nations 
Resource Library—Country Profiles, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/reslib/reslib_country_ 
profiles.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
4
 Betsy Cummings, Tiny Loans Stimulate the Appetite for More, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at C1. 
5
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, FINANCE FOR THE POOR: MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
17 (2000). 
6
 Aaron Jones, Promotion of Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in Emerging Markets, 13 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 187, 195 (2006). 
7
 JOSELITO GALLARDO, THE WORLD BANK, FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS: THE EXPERIENCE IN GHANA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES 4 (2002). 
8
 The Legal and Regulatory Framework Required to Enable Micro-finance Institutions to Operate 
Effectively, COUNTDOWN 2005: NEWSL. OF MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, May 2001, available at 
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/newsletter/aprms5.htm [hereinafter NEWSLETTER OF MICROCREDIT 
SUMMIT CAMPAIGN]. 
9
 Jones, supra note 6, at 194.  There are many different viewpoints on who fits into the category of 
the “poorest of the poor.”  See generally Measuring Poverty, http://go.worldbank.org/ZL042FVII0 (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
10
 GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4. 
11
 For information on the current status of legislation in many countries, see Microfinance 
Regulation and Supervision Resource Center, http://microfinancegateway.com/resource_centers/reg_sup 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
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increase legal certainty, encouraging more investors to enter the field and 
allowing MFIs to raise money by accessing world financial markets.12 
In 2004, Vietnam promulgated a decree (“Microfinance Decree”) 
regulating all microfinance institutions.13  While this new system creates a 
more predictable and stable environment, it does not achieve many of the 
goals of an “enabling” environment, and it threatens the viability of many 
MFIs already operating in Vietnam.  In order for microfinance to achieve its 
maximum potential in Vietnam, the legal framework needs to be changed to 
protect small, grassroots level MFIs, encourage the participation of foreign 
and commercial players, and reinforce industry best practices. 
Part II of this comment examines why microfinance has become a 
major international development tool.  Part III discusses the current trend 
towards regulating microfinance.  Part IV examines the history of 
microfinance in Vietnam and evaluates the effectiveness of provisions 
included in the Microfinance Decree.  Part V argues that Vietnam should 
make changes to protect small MFIs, encourage the participation of 
commercial and foreign players, and continue to develop the underlying 
regulatory scheme to improve the effectiveness of microfinance in Vietnam. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE: FROM SOCIAL EXPERIMENT TO 
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
Microfinance started out as a small-scale grassroots attempt to 
alleviate poverty.  Over the last 30 years, it has expanded into a major 
development tool.  Although this growth has met with some success, it has 
also revealed many of the limitations facing microfinance.  In an effort to 
strengthen microfinance, many practitioners and scholars have begun to 
examine the possibility of using legal and regulatory reform to address these 
concerns. 
A. Microfinance Has Grown from a Small-Scale Social Experiment to a 
Major Development Tool 
Microfinance is the provision of simple banking services to poor 
households and people.14  Microfinance is an umbrella term for a host of 
services including deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and 
                                           
12
 Jones, supra note 6, at 204. 
13
 Decree of the Government on Organization and Operation of Micro Finance Institutions in 
Vietnam, 28/2005/ ND—CP (2005) available at http://microfinancegateway.org/files/25507_file_Decree_ 
on_org_and_op_of_MFIs_in_Vietnam.pdf. [hereinafter Microfinance Decree]. 
14
 Jones, supra note 6, at 187. 
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insurance.15  Traditionally, the emphasis for microfinance has been on 
microcredit, a system of advancing small loans to low-income households to 
use in income-generating activities.16  Because the majority of MFIs today 
focus almost exclusively on microcredit, the two terms are used almost 
interchangeably.17  For this analysis, however, the terms will be used as 
separate concepts. 
Muhammad Yunus developed the earliest efforts in microfinance.18  
Yunus believed that poverty could be significantly alleviated by giving the 
poor opportunities to start their own small businesses.19 In 1974, Yunus 
loaned forty-two basket weavers the equivalent of twenty-seven dollars to 
start their own small businesses.20  Despite the fact that there were no signed 
agreements and no collateral attached to the loans, all forty-two participants 
repaid the loans in full.21  Encouraged by his success, Yunus went on to 
found the Grameen Bank.22  As of 2005, the Grameen Bank had 1740 
branches with 5.6 million customers.23 
Since Yunus’ initial experiment, microcredit has become a major 
international development tool.  Studies have shown that microfinance is 
effective at helping the poor to “improve household and enterprise 
management, increase productivity, smooth income flows and consumption 
costs, enlarge and diversify their microbusinesses, and increase their 
incomes.”24  A dramatic indicator of the international community’s 
acceptance of microcredit is the fact that the United Nations declared 2005 
the “International Year of Microcredit.”25  Encouraged by the success of 
Mohommad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, many organizations have since 
followed suit offering microcredit programs around the world.26  Although 
                                           
15
 Isobel Coleman, Defending Microfinance, 29-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 182 (2005). 
16
 Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of Globalizing 
Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 90-91 (2002). 
17
 Khandakar Elahi & Danopoulos, Microfinance and Third World Development: A Critical 
Analysis, 32 J. POL. & MILITARY SOC. 61, 62 (2004). 
18
 For a detailed history of Muhammad Yunus’ pioneering efforts, see MUHAMMAD YUNUS & ALAN 
JOLIS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (1999). 
19
 Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 62. 
20
 Id.  
21
 Celia Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans for Those Too Poor to Borrow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2006, at A1. 
22
 YUNUS & JOLIS, supra note 18, at xi. 
23
 Key Information of the Grammen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/infoharvus$.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
24
 MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR THE 
POOR 6 (2001). 
25
 International Year of Microcredit 2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org (last visited Apr. 17, 
2007). 
26
 Phillips et al., supra note 2. 
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the vast majority of microfinance programs are run by non-profit 
institutions, a few commercial banks, such as Citibank and HSBC, have 
begun to experiment with microfinance programs.27  Many high-tech 
philanthropists, such as the founders of Dell, Google, and Microsoft, have 
also donated large sums of money to expanding the scope of microfinance 
programs.28  As of 2005, there were over 10,000 MFIs operating throughout 
the world.29  These institutions made 100 million microloans in 2005.30  
Although the majority of programs have focused on microcredit, many 
advocates are calling for the expansion to other microfinance services.31 
B. Despite Some Success, Most Microfinance Programs Fail to Reach 
Maximum Effectiveness 
Despite the rapid expansion of microfinance services over the last 
three decades, MFIs face a number of significant hurdles to reaching their 
maximum potential and becoming sustainable institutions.  Although a few 
well-known MFIs have had considerable success, many early microfinance 
efforts were ad-hoc programs without a well-defined strategy.32  The Asian 
Development Bank (“ADB”), one of the major backers of microfinance 
programs in Asia, said that its own early microfinance attempts paid little 
attention to financial viability and were poorly targeted.33  Over the years, a 
large portion of microfinance programs have been dependent on private 
donor or government funding.34  Although both public and private sources 
are crucial to the development of microfinance, each source comes with its 
unique problems.  Private donors, although well intentioned, often want to 
see immediate results.35  This creates pressure on MFIs to implement too 
hastily, often before spending adequate time identifying target groups and 
tailoring programs to local needs.36  Government-run microfinance programs 
                                           
27
 Eric Bellman, Invisible Hand: Entrepreneur Gets Big Banks to Back Very Small Loans—
icrolending-for-Profit Effort In India Draws Business From Citigroup, HSBC—Ms. Dobbala's Baby 
Buffalo, WALL ST. J. (Eastern Edition), May 15, 2006, at A1. 
28
 Bruck, supra note 19. 
29
 Phillips et al., supra note 2.   
30
 Id. 
31
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 5, at 22. 
32
 BRETT E. COLEMAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE ROLE OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
IN PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE IN LAO PDR AND VIET NAM 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/27552_file_6.pdf. 
33
 Id. 
34
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 5, at 17. 
35
 Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. 
L. & COM. 303, 327-28 (2002). 
36
 Id. 
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also face their own challenges, often having distorted policy environments 
and lacking a business culture.37 
Unfortunately, the legal and regulatory environment in some countries 
prevents MFIs from adopting many sustainable practices.  One way to help 
MFIs become sustainable institutions is to allow MFIs to become deposit-
taking institutions.38  By leveraging deposits, MFIs are able to continue 
issuing microloans without being as dependent on outside sources.39  
Unfortunately, although some MFIs have indicated interest in coupling 
microsavings programs with microcredit, the legal and regulatory 
environment of most countries makes this impracticable.40  Targeted towards 
traditional banking, many countries’ banking laws set requirements for 
deposit-taking institutions that are unrealistic for the majority of MFIs.41  
Capital requirements, reporting protocols, and taxation policies may all 
prevent MFIs from mobilizing savings.42 
Allowing MFIs to become formal financial institutions could also 
allow them greater access to international financial markets.43  Traditional 
banks are hesitant to invest in MFIs unless they have appropriate legal and 
financial standing.44  Outside investors may also be unwilling to back MFIs 
“unless appropriate performance standards and regulation and supervision 
regimes are developed and enforced and measures are introduced to protect 
public deposits.”45  In addition to increasing private investment, many are 
hopeful that if MFIs become viable finance institutions, they may be able to 
raise money through securities issued in the formal financial market.46 
C. An Enabling Legal and Regulatory Environment Can Help Maximize 
the Potential of Microfinance 
Although there are many factors that need to be addressed before 
MFIs can reach their maximum potential,47 one key component is creating 
                                           
37
 COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 2. 
38
 GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4. 
39
 Id. 
40
 NEWSLETTER OF MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, supra note 8. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4. 
44
 Id. at 2. 
45
 COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 3. 
46
 GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4. 
47
 Other significant factors that need to be addressed include the lack of transportation, irrigation and 
telecommunications infrastructure.  Pierre Fallavier, Developing Micro-Finance Institutions in Vietnam: 
Policy Implications to Set up An Enabling Environment 55 (1994) (M.A. thesis, McGill University), 
available at http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~vecon/download/fallavier/mfi_vnm.pdf. 
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an “enabling” legal and regulatory framework.48  Rather than correcting 
perceived abuses in an industry, “enabling” legislation aims to encourage 
new institutions or improve the performance of existing ones.49  Examples of 
enabling legislation include revising existing banking regulations to allow 
deposit-taking,50 removing interest rate subsidies,51 and encouraging 
industry best practices by setting up MFI-appropriate auditing and reporting 
requirements.52  Creating an enabling legal and regulatory environment 
could remove the barriers that prevent MFIs from becoming deposit-taking 
institutions.53  Having a positive and predictable regulatory environment 
could also encourage existing microfinance backers to expand their current 
services.  For example, in a survey of existing microfinance institutions 
conducted in Vietnam, most programs stated that they had no plan to expand 
their geographic scope or to offer new services.54  Most of these programs 
pointed to “the lack of a clear legal and regulatory framework” as a key 
reason for their hesitancy to expand.55  In addition, many of the major 
institutional donors have begun to scrutinize individual countries’ legal and 
regulatory frameworks before deciding to invest.56  The ADB, one of the 
largest donors providing funding and technical support in Asia, now has a 
policy of not assisting microfinance programs in countries with an 
unfavorable policy environment.57 
III. ALTHOUGH MICROFINANCE IN VIETNAM HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS, 
ENABLING LEGISLATION COULD HELP MFIS ADVANCE 
Vietnam’s experience provides an interesting case study for other 
countries considering implementing microfinance laws.  Although there are 
a few other countries with some form of microfinance legal framework, 
Vietnam’s framework is one of the newest.  Rather than create a framework 
piece by piece, Vietnam instead drafted its new law after undertaking a study 
                                           
48
 ROBERT CHRISTEN ET AL., CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR & WORLD BANK, 
MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
MICROFINANCE 8 (July 2003), available at http://microfinancegateway.org/files/13473_13473.pdf. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 10. 
51
 KATE DRUSCHEL & ANNA BANTUG-HERRARA, USAID, MICRONOTE 10: THE ULTIMATE 
BALANCING ACT: INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MICROFINANCE 
(2005), available at http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=9097_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
52
 CHRISTEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 10. 
53
 GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4. 
54
 COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 18. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 2. 
57
 Id. 
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financed by the ADB.58  Vietnam also has a fairly well-developed 
microfinance sector.  It will be instructive to observe the effects of the new 
framework on already existing programs.  Examining the considerations that 
went into the new law, as well as its effects on the microfinance sector, will 
help other countries as they consider whether and how to attempt creating an 
enabling microfinance framework. 
A. Despite Vietnam’s Strong History of Supporting Microfinance, There 
Is Much Room for Improvement 
Vietnam has a strong history of encouraging the development of 
financial services for the poor.  Vietnam’s first experiments with 
microfinance came with the Doi Moi reforms of the 1980s.59  Formerly 
under a Soviet-style communist system, in 1985 Vietnam instituted a number 
of free-market economic reforms, eventually allowing private ownership of 
land.60  Previously, the central planning model generally ignored the 
financial needs of individuals and instead focused on financing state-owned 
enterprises.61  Gradually, the State Bank of Vietnam (“State Bank”) began to 
recognize the need for decentralized financial services targeted toward the 
general population.62  In 1990, the State Bank set up the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture (“VBA”) specifically to provide credit in rural areas at 
subsidized interest rates.63 
Despite some success, the VBA was not able to meet the full demand 
for loans and the government responded by creating People’s Credit Funds 
(“PCFs”) and the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (“VBP”).64  Created in 1994, 
PCFs were modeled after the credit-and-savings model developed by Yunus, 
with regional and national credit unions set up to advise local groups.65  The 
VBP, started a year later in 1995, was set up to offer collateral-free 
subsidized credit services to individuals too poor to qualify for other 
programs.66  All three programs were able to reach a large number of 
customers in a short time.  By 1996, the VBA had over 1800 branches 
providing credit to 7 million families, 674 PCFs were operating with 
                                           
58
 B. BYAMBASAIKHAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANT COMPLETION REPORT: 
TA 3741-VIE (2004), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/VIE/tacr-vie-3741.pdf. 
59
 Fallavier, supra note 47, at 48. 
60
 See id. 
61
 Id. at 64. 
62
 Id. at 65. 
63
 Id. at 65-66. 
64
 Id. at 66. 
65
 Id. at 65-66. 
66
 Id. at 66. 
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275,000 members, and the VBP had dispersed loans to approximately 1.3 
million families.67  Also during this same time period, a number of MFIs 
operated by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) began work in 
Vietnam.68  As of 2005, with the government and NGO programs combined, 
an estimated 70% of rural households were receiving some sort of MFI 
service.69 
Despite commendable efforts by both the public and the private 
sectors, there is still considerable room for improvement.  Although Vietnam 
is currently the second fastest growing economy in Asia,70 as of 2004, it still 
had a poverty rate of 28.9%.71  MFIs may reach a large section of rural 
households, but overall, 40% of poor households still do not have access to 
credit, either through formal or informal services.72  When they do have 
access, it is generally only to short-term microcredit and not to other 
financial services.73  Because of the subsidized interest rates offered by 
government programs, small NGO-run MFIs are often forced to operate at 
interest rates too low to allow them to break even, much less expand their 
offerings.74  A lack of commercialized distribution channels75 and poor 
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure76 also prevent existing 
programs from reaching the poorest of the poor.77  Even when MFIs operate 
in very impoverished areas, many people do not take advantage of 
opportunities because they do not understand the paperwork involved, are 
not aware of the existence of the programs, or the programs are not tailored 
to their individual circumstances.78 
                                           
67
 Id. at 65-66. 
68
 Id. at 68. 
69
 Doan Anh Tuan, Vietnam’s New Law on Microfinance: On the Way to an Enabling Environment 4 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Essays on Regulation and Supervision No. 17, 2005). 
70
 Joan L. Levinstein & Clay Chandler, Vietnam VroooooM: Asia's Second-Fastest-Growing 
Economy is Surging Ahead—and Taking Its Place on the Global Stage, FORTUNE, Dec. 11, 2006, at 147. 
71
 Tuan, supra note 69, at 3. 
72
 Daniel L. Zook, The Vietnamese Microfinance Sector 3 (The William Davidson Inst., Policy 
Briefs No. 35, 2005) available at http://www.wdi.umich.edu/Publications/PolicyBriefs. 
73
 Tuan, supra note 69, at 5. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Fallavier, supra note 47, at 55. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 59. 
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B. Before Passage of the Microfinance Decree, the Ambiguous Legal 
Status of MFIs Prevented Further Expansion of the Microfinance 
Sector 
Before passage of the Microfinance Decree, the only legal guidance 
covering MFIs was the Law on Credit Institutions (“Credit Institutions 
Law”), a general banking law that did not anticipate the unique features and 
challenges that would arise with the development of microfinance.79  The 
Credit Institutions Law regulates the “organization and operation of credit 
institutions and banking activities of other organizations.”80  The Credit 
Institutions Law defines “credit institutions” as enterprises that receive 
deposits, extend credit, and provide banking services.81  It also defines a 
class of “non-bank credit institutions,” which provide some banking services 
but do not receive deposits or accept payment services.82  Although this 
definition appears to cover MFIs, only joint-venture and 100% foreign-
owned non-bank credit institutions are allowed to apply for this status.83  
The Credit Institutions Law does not specifically address the status of 
MFIs.84  It states that those offering financial services without a license are 
subject to administrative sanctions and possibly even criminal prosecution.85  
Because MFIs could not establish themselves as independent institutions and 
did not want to violate banking laws, most operated as “projects” attached to 
other social programs.86  Most microfinance programs had more than one 
agency involved, and it was often unclear who had ownership rights to a 
specific program.87  This lack of ownership transparency made many 
agencies hesitant about the longer-term sustainability and accountability of 
microfinance programs.88 
Although already-existing MFIs seem willing to bear the risk of 
offering loans in an unpredictable policy environment, many MFIs are 
unwilling to expand their offerings or to increase the scale of their 
operations.89  When surveyed, the majority of MFIs in Vietnam said that the 
                                           
79
 Law 02-1997-QH10 on Credit Institutions (Vietnam) [hereinafter Credit Institutions Law]. 
80
 Id. at preamble. 
81
 Id. art. 20(1). 
82
 Id. art. 20(3). 
83
 Id. art. 107. 
84
 See generally Credit Institutions Law, supra note 79. 
85
 Id. arts. 125(1), 126. 
86
 Tuan, supra note 69, at 9. 
87
 Zook, supra note 72, at 4. 
88
 Id. 
89
 ADAM MCCARTY, MICROFINANCE IN VIETNAM: A SURVEY OF SCHEMES AND ISSUES 23 (2001). 
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most pressing need was for change to the legal environment facing MFIs.90  
The ADB, one of the primary microfinance donors in the region, has made 
legal reform one of the key conditions for its continued assistance with 
microfinance programs in Vietnam.91  The World Bank’s Rural Finance 
Program has also been unable to disburse funds to Vietnamese MFIs because 
the programs lack a clear legal status.92  A legal system that provides 
licensing gives MFIs a government stamp of approval, which, in turn, may 
make it easier for MFIs to access commercial financial markets.93  Many 
commercial banks and other capital lending institutions are also unwilling to 
lend to microfinance programs that are not licensed.94 
Outside of the ambiguous status of MFI loan programs, the Credit 
Institutions Law specifically prohibits offering certain financial services.95  
Payment and treasury services,96 participation in the national monetary 
market,97 and engaging in the insurance business are all practices 
specifically limited to recognized credit institutions.98  Arguably, the 
government has an interest in making sure that these types of services are 
limited to reputable companies.  Yet, although these services are offered 
through traditional banks, they are usually not offered on terms that are 
realistic for the poor.99 
Traditional banks are also ineffective at offering services in many 
geographically remote areas.100  Studies in other countries have 
demonstrated that there is a vast demand for microfinance services that are 
not currently offered.101  In particular, there is a growing demand for 
microsavings and microcredit services to help poor families weather 
financial risks such as illness, death of a family member, and natural 
                                           
90
 Id. 
91
 B. COLEMAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 
OF VIET NAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE 
3-4 (2005). 
92
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disasters.102  An enabling framework could allow MFIs to offer a wider 
range of microfinance services while at the same time ensuring that these 
new services are offered by stable accredited institutions. 
Another often cited barrier to the growth of the microfinance sector in 
Vietnam is the government policy of offering subsidized interest rates in 
state-administered MFI programs.103  Bank lending rates are capped at 
approximately 12-14% per annum.104  The VBP has a policy of charging 8-
9% while many other national programs offer rates that are even lower.105 
MFIs operating in Vietnam contend that in order to compete with 
government programs, they are forced to offer comparable interest rates.106  
At these interest rates, MFIs are unable to break even, much less expand 
their offerings.107  Research in other countries has demonstrated that the poor 
are willing to pay high interest rates to have access to financial services.108  
MFI operators insist that eliminating interest rate subsidies would encourage 
efficiency and allow MFIs to establish sustainable business models.109 
IV. ALTHOUGH THE MICROFINANCE DECREE ESTABLISHES SOME 
PREDICTABILITY, ITS ACTUAL IMPACT MAY YIELD MIXED RESULTS 
Hoping to build on the existing microfinance framework, in January 
2002, the government of Vietnam signed an agreement with ADB to receive 
technical assistance in the development of new microfinance legislation.110  
The final version of the Microfinance Decree was promulgated on March 9, 
2004.111  The Microfinance Decree requires that all microfinance operators 
transform into regulated MFIs by March 2007.112  The Microfinance Decree 
does not, however, regulate PCFs or the VBP.113 
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Now that Vietnam has passed a law specifically addressing the status 
of MFIs, it is important to examine not only what the law says but also 
whether the law meets the needs of the Vietnam microfinance sector.  
Specifically, this section will examine the scope of the law, provisions 
regulating deposit taking, finance activities allowed, measures to enforce 
industry best practice, and requirements for MFIs ownership.  Although on 
the surface many of the provisions appear to boost the Microfinance sector, 
some provisions may actually hurt existing MFIs.114  The new law also 
reinforces the status quo rather than encouraging innovation. 
A. By Requiring All MFIs to Comply, the Microfinance Decree May Push 
Smaller MFIs Out of Business 
Forcing all MFIs to come up with legal capital unnecessarily curtails 
small MFIs.  Furthermore, it offers very little systemic benefit.  The 
Microfinance Decree, which regulates all MFIs operating in Vietnam,115 
gives them two years from the date of enactment to comply with its 
provisions.116  In order to continue operation, each MFI must establish legal 
capital of 500 million VND ($31,400)117 and must apply for a license with 
the State Bank.118  Although it is important that a new law provide stability 
and predictability, bringing all MFIs under one umbrella may prove 
counterproductive.  An enabling law will ideally encourage willing MFIs to 
expand outside the grassroots, donor-funded, microcredit model while still 
protecting organizations that choose to follow the traditional model.119 
An enabling law should not preclude the grassroots model for MFIs, 
but forcing all MFIs to comply with registration requirements and to 
establish legal capital may do exactly that.  Small MFIs’ resources are 
stretched so thin that they may not be able to generate the required legal 
capital.120  Although already established MFIs may find ways to secure the 
capital, the capital requirement may discourage the establishment of new 
grassroots-level MFIs.  There is a growing consensus that not all MFIs need 
to be regulated.121  The main purpose of requiring legal capital is to ensure 
that financial institutions do not pose a threat to the financial system as a 
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whole.122  MFIs that only offer microloans do not pose a system-wide risk 
because, if they fold, there is no negative repercussion to their clients (in 
fact, it may provide a benefit because the clients may not have to repay their 
loans).123  Government oversight is cost intensive, and regulating all MFIs 
adds unnecessary administrative costs.124  Forcing all MFIs to come up with 
legal capital could unnecessarily curtail small MFIs and otherwise offer very 
little systemic benefit.125 
B. The New Microfinance Decree Improves Microfinance Regulation by 
Allowing MFIs to Become Deposit-Taking Institutions 
The most promising features of the Microfinance Decree are aimed at 
allowing MFIs to become deposit-taking institutions.  First, the 
Microfinance Decree allows MFIs to accept voluntary savings if they meet 
certain conditions.126  Deposit-taking MFIs must meet a higher legal capital 
requirement of five billion VND ($314,000).127  Second, before starting 
savings programs, MFIs must also have received compulsory savings for at 
least three years, have had sound operation for the last three years, have 
adequate administrators, controllers and managers, and have sufficient 
information systems.128  These new provisions are perhaps the most 
beneficial contribution of the new Microfinance Decree because they outline 
a clear, predictable route by which MFIs can become deposit-taking 
institutions.129  The legal capital requirement is quite reasonable compared to 
other countries in the region.130  Yet the capital requirement is high enough 
to preserve stability in the financial system as a whole by ensuring that only 
MFIs with adequate capital are offering deposit services.  Requiring MFIs to 
operate for three years also helps to minimize systemic risk by making sure 
that only healthy MFIs become deposit-taking institutions.  Third, the 
personnel and information system requirements also ensure that MFIs have 
the infrastructure in place to manage new deposits.  Lastly, the opt-in nature 
of these provisions allows MFIs to take on new programs and services on 
their own timetable.  This aspect of the new law encourages growth and 
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minimizes systemic risk while still allowing MFIs to create their own 
agendas. 
C. The Range of Services Authorized Under the Microfinance Decree 
Will Allow MFIs to Expand the Scope of Their Operations 
In addition to legitimizing programs already operating in Vietnam, the 
Microfinance Decree authorizes three new microfinance activities.  First, the 
Microfinance Decree specifically allows capital mobilization through 
compulsory and voluntary savings.131  Second, the Microfinance Decree 
allows MFIs to work as agents for banks and insurance companies.132  Third, 
the Microfinance Decree authorizes some payment services but does not 
elaborate on what those payment services will be.133  The Microfinance 
Decree does not, unfortunately, leave open the option to explore other 
activities outside the services specifically authorized.134 
By formally endorsing already existing programs, the Microfinance 
Decree helps bring clarity to a previously confusing policy environment.  
MFIs can feel confident that existing programs are now government-
sanctioned, which may make MFIs more willing to expand services into new 
areas.135  One of the criticisms of Vietnam’s existing microfinance 
environment is that the financial products available often do not meet the 
needs of the poorest of the poor.136  Allowing a greater range of services also 
gives MFIs more room to experiment with service offerings and to tailor 
their programs to the needs of their most needy constituents.137 
Although the new set of allowed activities gives MFIs some room to 
expand their offerings, the law does not go as far as it should.  MFIs are only 
allowed to offer financial products listed in the Microfinance Decree.138  
This new range of services gives MFIs room to expand and experiment, but 
limits growth by not giving them the option to create innovative products.  
Because the needs and financial problems of the poor are so unique, the 
financial solutions to these problems may need to be non-traditional.139  It is 
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understandable that Vietnam’s government may not want to give MFIs too 
much leeway in creating new financial products that may pose some system 
risk.  However, modifying the legal structure to allow experimentation on a 
case-by-case basis would open the field to innovation while still allowing the 
government to maintain some level of control. 
D. Although the Microfinance Decree’s Provisions Aimed at Encouraging 
Best Practices Will Raise the Level of Professionalism, They Will 
Unduly Burden Small MFIs 
The Microfinance Decree’s provisions aimed at encouraging industry 
best practice will help to strengthen existing microfinance programs and to 
raise professionalism in the industry.  In order to apply for licensing, all 
MFIs must submit a draft charter, a feasibility study, curriculum vitas of all 
leaders, documentation on capital contributors, and information on the MFI’s 
financial situation.140  The Microfinance Decree lays out organizational 
governance standards, requiring that each MFI have a Board of 
Management, an Audit Committee, and a Director.141  The Microfinance 
Decree lists a number of factors which may disqualify a person from serving 
in any of these positions, including having a criminal history, being a 
representative of a company that failed because of bankruptcy or legal 
violations, or being a close relative of someone else in management.142  The 
Microfinance Decree authorizes the State Bank to set requirements for the 
qualifications of each of these governing bodies.143  The Microfinance 
Decree also authorizes the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance to 
implement a standardized reporting and statistics system for all MFIs.144 
On one hand, these new requirements take positive steps towards 
enabling the microfinance industry in Vietnam.  Requiring feasibility studies 
will encourage MFIs to have well thought out long-range objectives and may 
prevent the ad hoc attempts of the past.  Setting minimum requirements for 
leaders will also help to encourage professionalism in the industry and 
prevent people with criminal pasts from entering the industry.  A unified 
reporting and statistic system could help MFIs share information with each 
other and foster efforts to improve the industry as a whole.145  The reports 
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could also help the Bank of Vietnam to assess the status of the industry and 
develop policies that are more responsive to current needs.146 
Unfortunately, compelling all MFIs to comply with licensing 
requirements may also place undue burdens on cash-strapped, small MFIs.  
Audits and statistical reports are often expensive and labor intensive.  One 
MFI in Latin America found that complying with reporting requirements in 
their country cost an amount equal to 5% of their loan portfolio.147  Some 
practitioners in the microfinance industry are also concerned that the 
qualifications requirements for leaders will not be achievable.148  They are 
also concerned that Vietnam does not have enough qualified individuals to 
fill all the positions necessary.149  If this is true, there will be a higher than 
normal demand for qualified individuals and small MFIs may not be able to 
afford the salaries.  This perceived shortage of qualified individuals will 
most likely disappear over time, but in the short run small MFIs may not be 
able to find leadership that qualifies them to register for MFI status. 
E. New Provisions Restricting MFI Ownership Unnecessarily Reinforce 
the Status Quo 
The Microfinance Decree lays out two types of organizations that may 
establish MFIs in Vietnam.  The first type consists of “[s]ocio-political 
organizations, social organizations, socio-professional organizations of 
Vietnam, charity funds and social funds.”150  The second group includes 
“Vietnamese non-governmental organizations.”151  Conspicuously absent 
from these groups are commercial organizations or foreign-run 
organizations.152  The Microfinance Decree does allow foreign organizations 
and individuals to contribute capital to authorized groups, but it does not 
clarify what role these foreign entities may have in MFIs.153 
The Microfinance Decree echoes provisions in the Credit Institutions 
Law that discourage foreign financial institutions from participating in the 
Vietnamese system.154  Discouraging the full participation of foreign and 
commercial enterprises is short-sighted at best.  Worldwide, foreign non-
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profits are important sources of MFI funding.155  In Vietnam, the presence of 
foreign non-profits is still limited.156  Although the Microfinance Decree 
provides predictability for domestic institutions, foreign institutions are left 
in a policy environment just as unpredictable as before.  Although they are 
new players in the microfinance scene, commercial entities provide an 
important source of possible future growth.157  Carlos Labarthe of 
Compartamos, the largest microfinance institution in Latin America, argues 
that within five years, 80-90% of microfinance institutions will be 
commercial.158  Some scholars, policy-makers, and commentators contend 
that commercialization is the only way to meet the vast demand for 
microfinance services.159  Although it may be wise for the Vietnamese 
government to develop guidelines that ensure commercial microfinance 
programs fulfill social objectives, completely barring them from entering the 
field discourages innovation. 
V. VIETNAM NEEDS TO PROTECT SMALL MFIS, INCLUDE NEW PLAYERS, 
AND CREATE A SUPPORTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
Although the new Microfinance Decree helps establish some 
predictability and stability in the microfinance system, the new regulatory 
scheme has a long way to go before it can truly enable MFIs operating in 
Vietnam.  During its final assessment of the new law, the ADB stated that “it 
is expected that the decree will mark an improvement in the policy 
environment, but will still fall short of a genuinely enabling decree.”160  The 
Vietnam regulatory scheme could be vastly improved by finding a way to 
accommodate small MFIs, addressing the issue of interest rate subsidies, 
finding a way to include international and commercial players, and making 
sure that the regulatory framework that is in place is effectively 
administered. 
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A. The Microfinance Framework in Vietnam Should Be Altered to 
Encourage the Growth of Small MFIs 
Rather than enabling the growth of the microfinance sector, the 
Microfinance Decree instead threatens the viability of small, grassroots 
MFIs.  As discussed,161 the Microfinance Decree sets capital requirements 
and reporting standards with which cash-strapped MFIs find it difficult to 
comply.162  Vietnam could adjust its framework to accommodate these 
smaller MFIs in a number of ways.  Perhaps the easiest way would be to 
exempt MFIs under a certain size from complying with regulations.  These 
MFIs are so small that they do not pose a systemic threat to the Vietnamese 
banking system.  At the very least, the small MFIs could be given an 
extended time period before they have to comply so that they can build 
capital to meet the Microfinance Decree’s requirements. 
If Vietnam is unwilling to exempt small MFIs, another option is to 
create a separate category for MFIs under a certain size.  The Microfinance 
Decree has two tiers for requirements:  one for non-deposit-taking 
institutions and another for deposit-taking institutions.163  Adding a third tier 
for small MFIs that meet certain requirements would allow the government 
to maintain some control over MFIs while still leaving a place for small 
MFIs within the system. 
B. Vietnam’s Microfinance Legal Framework Should Include 
Commercial and International Players 
In addition to taking further steps to protect existing MFIs, Vietnam 
should modify the current framework to include new players.  The current 
regulations reinforce the status quo by allowing only domestic, non-profit 
entities to operate as MFIs.164  Although the Microfinance Decree allows 
foreign and commercial groups to invest in existing MFIs, it is vague as to 
what role these groups may have in directing the day-to-day affairs of MFIs 
in which they invest.165  Lawmakers should modify the existing framework 
by changing the provisions that restrict foreign and commercial entities.  If 
the Vietnamese government has specific concerns about these entities, they 
could include requirements that guarantee MFIs run by these entities still 
meet social objectives.  For example, the Vietnamese government could 
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include consumer protection provisions to ensure that commercial MFIs do 
not take advantage of their customers. 
If the Microfinance Decree is not modified to allow these new players 
to own MFIs outright, policy-makers should, at the very least, alter the law 
to clarify the status of commercial and foreign entities investing in existing 
MFIs.  Foreign and commercial partners may be unwilling to contribute 
money to MFIs when there is no guarantee that the funds will be used 
according to their wishes.  Commercial entities in particular may be 
unwilling to bear the risk of partnering with MFIs if their claim on funds is 
tenuous.  Although commercial players are just beginning to take part in the 
global microfinance industry, many predict that commercially-driven 
microfinance projects will be the next wave of growth.166  If Vietnam does 
not take steps to clarify the status of commercial investors, MFIs in the 
country may be passed over for MFIs in countries where the status is clearer.  
Cutting off this valuable source of potential funds is short-sighted and does 
not enable Vietnam to participate in the global MFI market to the same 
extent as other countries in the region. 
C. Vietnam’s New Microfinance Law Can Enable Growth Only If It Is 
Supported by Enabling Regulations 
Even with the positive changes outlined in the Microfinance Decree, 
the new law on microfinance will not create an enabling environment unless 
it is actually implemented.  The Microfinance Decree indicates a number of 
future regulations which must be promulgated by the State Bank.167  
Drafting these regulations will require a large amount of funding and 
expertise.  In 2005, the ADB launched a technical assistance program which 
authorized $315,000 in funding to help Vietnam follow through with the 
creation of the necessary supporting regulatory framework.168  This technical 
assistance program will not only assist with drafting legal documents, but 
will also provide training for State Bank staff and workshops for MFIs.169  
The technical assistance program also includes funds for sending two 
delegations of government officials on study tours of other Asian countries 
that already have strong, well-developed microfinance regulatory 
structures.170 
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Although the ADB technical assistance program will help to establish 
a strong foundation, the State Bank must make implementation a key focus 
in order for the Microfinance Decree to enable the microfinance industry in 
Vietnam.  MFIs may have very little incentive to follow the industry best 
practices outlined in the Microfinance Decree if there is no oversight.  MFIs 
will also be more incentivized to comply with reporting procedures if the 
data gathered is used to create more favorable policy.  Perhaps most 
importantly, in order for the new Microfinance Decree to create stability and 
predictability, the regulations that support it must also be clear, 
unambiguous, and easy to navigate.  Without an easy-to-navigate regulatory 
scheme, MFIs may still hesitate to expand current offerings or start new 
programs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With the assistance of the ADB, Vietnam joined the ranks of a 
growing number of countries that have created a special legal and regulatory 
framework for MFIs.  Although the Microfinance Decree helps to provide 
more stability and predictability, the new law also contains provisions which 
place undue burdens on small MFIs and unnecessarily limit the participation 
of foreign and domestic entities.  In order for the new law to truly enable the 
growth of microfinance, Vietnam needs to accommodate small MFIs, 
include measures to encourage the participation of new types of MFIs, and 
make sure that the provisions already in place are actually implemented.  If 
Vietnam continues to move towards a truly enabling environment, it will be 
able to build from a solid foundation and help its poorest citizens become 
full participants in Vietnam’s growing economy. 
